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Facing up to the facts: What causes economic perceptions?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The link between individual perceptions of the economy and vote choice is fundamental to 
electoral accountability. Yet, while it is well-established that economic perceptions are 
correlated with voting behaviour, it is unclear whether these perceptions are rooted in the real 
economy or whether they simply reflect voters’ partisan biases. This study uses time-series 
data, survey data and unique experimental evidence to shed new light on how British voters 
update their economic perceptions in response to economic change. Our findings demonstrate 
that while partisanship influences levels of economic optimism, people respond to 
information about real economic changes by adjusting their economic perceptions.  
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Models of economic voting assume that voters respond to changes in the real economy by 
updating their economic perceptions and rewarding or punishing the incumbent government 
accordingly (for an overview see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). While views differ on 
how exactly the economic vote works, scholars generally agree that economic conditions are 
important determinants of incumbent vote choice (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck 
1988; Van Der Brug et al 2007; Lewis-Beck and Whitten  2013).  Yet, a burgeoning literature 
suggests that this link between the economy and voters’ sanctioning of governments is largely 
illusory. Instead of basing evaluations of economic performance on facts, it is argued that it is 
partisanship that shapes economic perceptions. As partisans tend to perceive the economy in a 
way that credits their own party, the relationship between the real economy and perceptions 
of the economy is weakened (Wlezien et al. 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006; Lavine et al 
2012; Bartels 2002; De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Evans and Pickup 2010; Enns et al. 2012).  
 
We revisit the debate about the degree to which people’s economic perceptions are rooted in 
economic reality or partisan biases by exploring a question that has been largely overlooked: 
do people adjust their economic perceptions when information about the economy changes? 
By complementing the analysis of existing time-series data with a unique survey that includes 
an embedded experiment, we examine how citizens update their perceptions when new 
information arrives. We show that while partisanship influences the level of economic 
optimism and pessimism, people’s perceptions of the economy do respond to information 
about changes in real economic indicators. Specifically, we report three main findings. First, 
real world conditions profoundly shape economic perceptions. Economic growth is strongly 
related to how people view the state of the economy. Moreover, while government partisans 
are consistently more optimistic than opposition partisans, everyone reacts in a similar way to 
changes in the real economy. Second, people’s views and knowledge of real economic 
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indicators shape their perceptions of general economic performance, even when accounting 
for partisanship. Third, people who hold inaccurate views about the real economy update 
their general economic perceptions when confronted with correct information about 
unemployment and growth.  
 
These results have important implications for our understanding of the ability of voters to use 
elections to hold governments accountable for economic outcomes. The core intuition of the 
economic voting model is that voters punish governments for bad economic performance and 
reward them for good performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Nannestad and Paldam 1994). For this 
reward-punishment mechanism to work, people need to update their knowledge about real 
economic indicators, change their subjective economic evaluations and then decide whether 
to throw the rascals out or not. Our findings suggest that while partisan biases exist and are 
persistent, changes and signals from the real economy do change people’s general perceptions 
in line with economic developments. Thus, partisan biases can co-exist with economic voting 
and electoral accountability. 
 
This study proceeds as follows. First, we briefly introduce the ongoing debate about the 
extent to which people’s economic perceptions are rooted in economic reality or partisan 
biases. We develop our argument that although partisan biases influence the level of 
economic optimism, information about changes to economic reality nonetheless shapes 
people’s economic perceptions. Next, we present three empirical tests of this argument using 
recent data from Britain. First, we use time series data from the British Election Study 
Continuous Monitoring Surveys (BES-CMS) 2004-2013 to examine whether people’s 
economic perceptions track real world economic conditions, and how partisanship colours 
these perceptions. Second, we look at an original survey of a representative sample of the 
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British population to examine how specific knowledge of unemployment and growth rates 
affects general economic perceptions. Third, we analyse a survey-embedded experiment that 
allows us to examine how people respond to new information about the economy, and 
disentangle the causal relationships between real-world economic information, partisanship 
and economic perceptions. We conclude by highlighting the importance of our findings for 
the study of economic voting and the origins of economic perceptions. 
 
What shapes economic perceptions? 
Perceptions of the economy matter when voters decide which party to support. Economic 
perceptions are highly correlated with vote choice: voters are more likely to oust an 
incumbent when they perceive the economy to have deteriorated (for overviews see Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck and Whitten 2013). This raises the question of what 
information people use to generate these evaluations of the economy. This question is crucial 
to models of economic voting that rely on the assumption that there is a relationship between 
changes in the real economy, people’s economic perceptions and ultimately their behaviour at 
the ballot box. For the economic vote to exist, people need to use recent economic 
information to update their economic evaluations (Gerber and Green 1998, 1999).  
 
The degree to which people's economic perceptions are in fact rooted in economic reality is a 
topic of much debate. A large body of work suggests that economic reality does affect 
economic evaluations. For instance, when inflation or unemployment rates rise, people’s 
economic evaluations become more pessimistic (Fuhrer 1988; Krause 1997). Moreover, 
MacKuen and colleagues show that although voters may have hazy factual knowledge about 
the state of the economy, their overall sense of macro-economic improvement and decline (or 
‘mood’ of the economy) is often remarkably acute (MacKuen et al 1992, Erikson et al 2002). 
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Finally, Lewis-Beck and colleagues (Lewis-Beck 2006; Lewis-Beck et al 2008; Lewis-Beck 
and Whitten 2013; Nadeau et al 2013) have repeatedly shown that that economic perceptions 
are both linked to economic reality and influence people’s decisions at the ballot box.  
 
Nonetheless, other studies have cast doubt on the competency of voters to punish or reward 
governments on the basis of economic performance. For example, Blendon et al. (1997) 
suggest that only one out of eight US respondents can correctly cite the rate of inflation and 
unemployment within half a percentage point. Similarly, Conover et al (1986) show that US 
voters know little about unemployment and inflation rates (although they do also show that 
trends, particularly in unemployment, are picked up much faster). Nannestad and Paldam 
(2000) report similar findings for Denmark. Equally, Ansolabehere and colleagues (2013) 
show that while people hold quite accurate views of familiar economic quantities like petrol 
prices, more abstract quantities, like unemployment levels, are difficult to grasp. Healy and 
Lenz (2014) demonstrate that voters may intend to hold governments to account for 
cumulative growth, but given that this information is not readily available to them, they 
simply use economic conditions at the end of the electoral cycle. Related studies of 
misinformation have found that widespread misinformation can lead to collective preferences 
that are far different from those that would exist if people were correctly informed (Kuklinski 
et al. 2000). All in all, this evidence suggests that people may actually be rather ill-informed 
about the state of the real economy.  
 
What is more, people’s perceptions about economic conditions may not just be inaccurate, 
but also strongly distorted by political confounders (Conover et al 1986, Wlezien et al 1997, 
De Boef and Kellstedt 2004, Bartels 2002, Evans and Andersen 2006; Enns et al. 2012; 
Bisgaard 2015). This alternative view to the ‘rational voter’ model claims that partisanship 
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leads people to resist new information (Zaller 1992; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lavine at al 
2012).1 Partisanship provides a lens through which individuals view the political world 
(Campbell et al. 1960; see also Johnston 2006) and produces systematic biases in what 
political information citizens attend to and how that information is interpreted, processed and 
evaluated (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Erikson et al. 2002). Thus, people largely ignore facts 
about the economy, and economic perceptions stem primarily from partisan attachments. 
People who prefer governing parties are on average more positive about the economy than 
people who prefer an opposition party. For example, Bartels (2002) argues that Democrats 
and Republicans have drastically different views of objective economic conditions such as 
the budget deficit or unemployment rates. Over half of Democrats in 1988 claimed that 
inflation had worsened since 1980 even though it had actually significantly improved (Bartels 
2002). Ansolabehere and colleagues (2013) show that partisans of the incumbent party 
underestimate unemployment figures while opposition partisans overestimate them. Other 
research has also shown that individuals are reluctant to update their beliefs when presented 
with corrective information, if that information runs counter to their ideological 
predisposition (see e.g. Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Finally, Evans and colleagues have more 
generally shown that partisan biases consistently skew general perceptions of economic 
performance (Evans and Andersen 1996, Evans and Pickup 2010; Pickup and Evans 2013).  
 
In contrast to the classic model of the rational economic voter, the consensus in these studies 
is the link between real world economic conditions and economic perceptions is rather weak, 
                                                 
1
 A complicating factor here is that economic information is often provided by political actors who have an 
incentive to actively distort perceptions about the actual state of the economy (Besley and Prat 2006, Larcinese 
et al. 2011). Indeed Alt et al (2014) show that a source with higher credibility based on institutional expertise 
and limited incentives to deceive, like an independent central bank, affects voters more than partisan sources. 
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while strong links exists between partisanship and economic conditions. We suggest that both 
causes of economic perceptions are in fact simultaneously at work. Our argument is simple. 
We maintain that although partisan biases distort economic perceptions, changes to economic 
reality still instigate changes to people’s perceptions. In other words, while government 
partisans are likely to remain more positive about the economy than opposition partisans, 
they nonetheless adjust their perceptions downwards when receiving negative economic 
news, such as in times of economic crisis.  
 
In order to empirically examine our argument, we thus focus on the malleability of economic 
perceptions in response to (information about) changes in the real economy. We test our 
argument in three ways. First, we assess whether people’s economic perceptions track real 
world economic conditions. Second, we examine how specific knowledge of unemployment 
and growth rates affects general economic perceptions. Third and finally, we disentangle the 
causal relationship between real-world economic information and economic perceptions by 
means of a survey experiment.  
 
Economic perceptions and changes in the real economy: time-series analysis 
For the first part of our analysis, we use time series data, monthly national surveys of the 
British electorate, from the British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Surveys (BES-
CMS) from 2004 to 2013. There are two distinct advantages to looking at British data from 
2004 to 2013. First, there was a severe and unexpected economic crisis in the UK in the 
middle of the time period. As a result, people were given new unambiguous information 
about the state of the economy. Second, there was a change in government in May 2010 
which allows us to examine responses to economic change for different groups of 
government partisans.  
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In order to examine if economic evaluations follow real world economic conditions, we 
regress people’s general economic perceptions against real economic performance and 
partisanship. The economic perceptions question is the standard retrospective evaluation that 
ask people whether they think that the general economic situation in the UK has changed 
over the last 12 months, with response categories of got “a lot better”, “a little better”, 
“stayed the same”, got “a little worse”, got “a lot worse”. Government partisans are those 
who identify with the Labour Party from 2004 up to May 2010 and those who identify with 
the Conservative or Liberal Democrat parties after May 2010.2 All others who gave a valid 
response (i.e. that mentioned another party) are counted as “opposition” partisans.  
 
In order to get a sense of the degree to which people’s economic evaluations track real world 
conditions, Figure 1 plots the mean economic evaluation per month against the predicted 
mean retrospective economic evaluations from a regression model between 2004 and 2013. 
The predicted mean retrospective economic evaluations is based on an OLS regression model 
which predicts retrospective economic evaluations using real monthly economic growth 
figures3, while controlling for socio-demographics and time (i.e. month), with clustered 
standard errors for each time period (full results are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix). 
The figure shows that when real economic growth rates change, so do economic perceptions. 
                                                 
2
 Partisan identity is measured using the standard question in Britain of: “Generally speaking, do you think of 
yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what?” Those respondents that did not provide an answer 
to this question, they responded not or don’t know, received a follow-up question in which they were asked if 
they felt closer to any particular party. We use both questions to establish the share of Conservative, Labour, and 
Liberal Democrat identifiers. 
3
 The growth estimates are obtained from the Office of National Statistics in the United Kingdom, see 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/site-information/using-the-website/time-series/index.html. 
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In the aggregate at least people appear to be able to grasp, and respond to, changes in real 
world economic conditions.  
 
FIGURE 1:  Relationship between growth and retrospective economic evaluations 
 
  
 
Note: This figure show the actual mean retrospective economic evaluations (labelled Actual Evaluation) 
against the predicted mean retrospective economic evaluations from a regression model (labelled Predicted 
Evaluation). The predicted mean retrospective economic evaluations are based on an OLS regression model 
(full results are displayed in Table A1 in the supporting information document) that predicts retrospective 
economic evaluations using real monthly economic growth figures, socio-demographics and time (i.e. month), 
with clustered standard errors for each time period. The actual rates of growth are taken from the Office for 
National Statistics. 
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This does not preclude the presence of strong partisan effects, however. Figure 2 shows 
retrospective economic evaluations based on partisanship. Specifically, it plots evaluations 
for government partisans - that is to say respondents who identify with Labour before the 
2010 general election and with the Conservative or Liberal Democrats after - and opposition 
partisans. The predicted mean retrospective economic evaluations are estimated from a 
regression including partisanship, month and an interaction between the two as well as a set 
of socio-demographic controls such as education, social class, age and gender (full results are 
presented in Table A2 of the Appendix). The results in Figure 2 clearly show that government 
partisans always hold more optimistic views about the economy compared to opposition 
partisans.4 When Labour lost office in 2010, Labour partisans who were previously more 
optimistic than the average voter, suddenly become more pessimistic. Partisanship thus exerts 
a powerful influence on perceptions of economic conditions.5 This is in line with other time-
series analyses of economic perceptions, such as Enns et al. (2012), which have shown that 
partisanship shapes consumer sentiments. 
  
                                                 
4
 The only exception to this pattern is government partisans in mid-2010. This is presumably due to the fact that 
retrospective evaluations of these government partisans, Conservative and Liberal Democrats supporters, still 
reflect a bias towards the perceived failures of the previous Labour government. 
5
 There is some weak evidence here that partisan biases are reduced when the information people receive is 
relatively unambiguous (i.e. during the financial crisis). This would accord with Parker-Stephen’s (2013) claims 
that disagreement between partisans in the US on the state of the economy was greater when economic 
conditions were “ordinary” rather than when they were “glorious” or “abysmal”. It is difficult to reject the 
possibility that these are merely floor effects of the measure however. Almost every opposition partisan thought 
things had got ‘a lot worse’ during 2008. If a further option of ‘got a lot worse’ had been available it seems 
likely that many opposition partisans would have taken it.  
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FIGURE 2:  Retrospective economic evaluations by government and opposition partisans 
 
 
  
 
Note: This figure plots the predicted mean retrospective economic evaluations estimated from a regression by 
partisanship. Specifically, the model regresses retrospective economic evaluations against partisanship, time 
(i.e. month), an interaction between the partisanship and time as well as a set of socio-demographic controls 
(full results are presented in Table A2 of the supporting information document). Vertical line refers to the 2010 
general election which resulted in a change of government from a Labour government to a Conservative-led 
coalition government. 
 
 
This partisan effect appears largely constant however. People certainly view the economic 
world through a partisan lens, but when circumstances change people change their opinions. 
The pattern of change that we see in Figure 1 is very similar for government and opposition 
partisans, even though partisan biases persist over time. At the aggregate level, people react 
to poor economic news in a sensible manner. The next step is to examine the micro-
mechanisms of how changes in the economy translate into changing individual-level 
perceptions of behaviour.  
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How economic knowledge affect perceptions of the economy: survey evidence 
To examine the individual-level determinants of economic perceptions, we examine whether 
people’s knowledge of economic indicators affects their general economic perceptions. At the 
micro-level we expect that people rely on some understanding of changes in key economic 
indicators, such as growth and unemployment, when generating their own general 
perceptions of economic performance (MacKuen et al 1992, Erikson et al 2002). We test this 
by analysing an original survey of a representative sample of the British population 
conducted in December 2013.6 The first step is to ascertain the accuracy of people’s 
perceptions of the economy. We focus on the two primary indicators generally used to 
measure a country’s economic performance: growth and unemployment. Rather than asking 
respondents to give us the precise growth and unemployment figures, which is a tall order 
even for the most politically savvy voter, we provide them with actual information on growth 
and unemployment for the previous year as a benchmark, and ask them to tell us the figure 
for the current year. This means that an informed citizen, who was aware that conditions had 
been improving, would be able to give a reasonable estimate of growth and unemployment 
using the benchmark information. Ultimately, this provides us with an appropriate 
measurement of whether voters are competent to engage in economic voting. Civic 
competence does not require one to have an encyclopaedic knowledge of the exact growth 
                                                 
6
 The sample was recruited by YouGov, and it is representative of the British population by sex, region, age, 
partisanship and occupational social class. Total sample size was 4,088. Our survey questions were embedded in 
a larger survey not dedicated only to questions about politics and economics. Respondents were selected 
randomly from an online research panel of over 750,000 adults living in the United Kingdom. YouGov uses 
sophisticated recruitment and weighting schemes in efforts to offset sampling biases and offers modest financial 
incentives to bolster response rates, which are comparable to face-to-face surveys in the United Kingdom. A 
study comparing YouGov surveys with the British Election Study showed only small differences in the 
distributions of key explanatory variables in models of turnout and party choice (Sanders et al. 2007). 
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rate in the third quarter of this year, rather it means that one knows whether things are better 
or worse than they were previously. If things are better, one can reward the government; if 
things are worse, one can punish the government.  
 
To ensure that the information is highly credible and non-partisan, we provide respondents 
with actual figures from the Office of National Statistics, which is recognized as the UK’s 
independent national statistical institute. The questions for growth and unemployment are 
worded as follows: 
 
a) Growth question 
According to the Office for National Statistics, between January and September in 2012 the 
economy grew by 0.1% (a growth rate of +0.1%). The Office for National Statistics recently 
released the economic growth figures for the nine months from January to September 2013. 
 
What do you think the growth rate was for the January-September period in 2013?  
 
 
b) Unemployment question 
According to the Office for National Statistics, the UK unemployment rate for the July to 
September 2012 period was 7.8%. The Office for National Statistics recently released the 
unemployment figures for July-September 2013. 
 
What do you think the unemployment rate was for the July-September period in 2013? 
 
 
By looking at the distribution of people’s responses to the questions on unemployment and 
growth, we can assess whether most people had a good idea of how the economy had 
changed over the last 12 months. The answer to that is yes and no. Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of answers along with the correct answer and the benchmark, of the previous 12 
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months rate, given in the question.7   
FIGURE 3:  Distribution of responses about the current rate of unemployment and the 
current rate of growth   
 
   
 
Note: These figures show the distribution of responses to the questions ‘what do you think the growth rate was 
for the January-September period in 2013?’ and ‘what do you think the unemployment rate was for the July-
September period in 2013?’. Respondents were given the benchmark figure from a year prior to that asked 
about. This benchmark rate is marked on the graphs. The correct rates of growth and unemployment are also 
marked on the graphs and are taken from the Office for National Statistics. 
  . 
 
 
For unemployment, which changed little over the period, most people gave an answer that 
was fairly close to the actual outcome. Nearly half of respondents estimated the 
unemployment rate within 0.5 per cent of the actual rate. Of course, since unemployment had 
                                                 
7
 Although we did not allow people to give a ‘don’t know’ answer to the estimation questions, we have excluded 
a small number of people who gave answers that were well outside a reasonable range for both unemployment 
and growth. Some of these answers appear to be typing errors (76.00 per cent unemployment for example) and 
some an attempt to go through the questions as quickly as possible (99.99 per cent growth for example). 
Answers like this tend to be correlated. For unemployment, we exclude people that said the new rate was below 
1 per cent or above 15 per cent (7 per cent of the total sample that were asked this question), and for growth we 
exclude people that said the new rate was below -7 per cent or above 7 per cent (4 per cent of the total sample 
that were asked this question). 
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changed little, this also means that nearly half of people put the unemployment rate within 
0.5 per cent of the benchmark figure given. For growth, there is much more divergence 
between the benchmark and the outcome, and we see the distribution centred around the 
benchmark not the correct rate. Nearly half of respondents gave an answer between 0 and 0.5 
per cent, and less than a fifth of people gave an answer within 0.5 per cent of the correct rate. 
Nonetheless, people’s sense of the direction of change for economic growth was quite good. 
Few people said growth was lower (16 per cent) or the same (15 per cent) as the benchmark, 
most people thought growth was higher.   
 
TABLE 1:  OLS regression models predicting economic perceptions   
 Model 1  Model 2  
 B SE B SE 
Growth estimate (relative to benchmark)  0.28* 0.03 0.22* 0.03 
Unemployment estimate (relative to benchmark) -0.12* 0.01 -0.10* 0.02 
 
    
Opposition party identification   -0.55* 0.07 
No party identification   -0.31* 0.09 
Government party identification (reference)   - - 
 
    
Voted Labour 2010   -0.16 0.09 
Voted Conservative 2010   0.08 0.09 
Voted Liberal 2010   0.04 0.09 
Voted other 2010   -0.38* 0.13 
Didn’t vote 2010 (reference)   - - 
     
Intercept 1.88* 0.03 2.45* 0.12 
R-square 0.14  0.28  
* p< .05.  N = 990.  
 
Note: This table shows the results of two OLS regression models that predict people’s economic perceptions on 
a 0-3 scale. 0 represents economic conditions getting a lot worse and 3 represents economic conditions getting 
a little or a lot better. People’s estimates of growth and unemployment are relative to the benchmark provided 
to them, thus positive numbers indicate an improvement in growth and a worsening of unemployment relative 
to a year ago. Also included in model 2, but not shown here, are controls for education, occupational class, age 
and gender. 
 
How do these specific views of unemployment and growth relate to general perceptions of 
economic performance? As with the time series data we examine general subjective 
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perceptions of the economy, using the standard retrospective economic evaluation question: 
‘Thinking generally about the economy, how would you say that economic conditions have 
changed over the last 12 months?’. Table 1 shows the results of two OLS regression models 
predicting general economic perceptions for a subset of the whole sample. Ordered logit 
models give very similar substantive results (see Table A3 in the Appendix for the full 
results). Economic perceptions are measured on a scale running from 0 (things had got a lot 
worse over the last 12 months) to 3 (things over the last 12 months have got better).8 We 
include the estimates of unemployment and growth relative to their benchmarks in model 1. 
Both these effects are statistically significant: people who thought growth was higher and 
unemployment was lower are people who have a rosier view of the general economic 
situation. Importantly, this still holds when we control for partisanship and vote choice at the 
previous general election. Model 2 includes current party identification, vote choice in the 
2010 election and a several of other control variables, not shown in the table, that may relate 
to economic perceptions (educational qualifications, occupational social class, age and 
gender).9 The effects of people’s estimates of growth and unemployment are slightly reduced 
                                                 
8
 Very few people said that economic conditions had improved a lot so the categories of the original question 
that indicted ‘improved a little’ and ‘improved a lot’ have been combined. 
9
 Party identification is measured using two questions. The first asks respondents ‘Generally speaking, do you 
think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what?’. For those who answer ‘no party’, there 
is a follow up question that asks ‘Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than 
the others?’. All people who answered the first or second question with Conservative or Liberal Democrat are 
coded as government partisans, people who answered any other party (mostly Labour) are opposition partisans 
and people who gave no party identity to either question are non-partisans. Education is a five category measure 
of highest qualification (degree; some higher education; A-level or equivalent; O-Level or equivalent; less than 
O-level). Occupational class is a four category measure of social grade and self-employment (AB grade; C 
grade; DE grade; self-employed). The measure of age is six age groups (18-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51-60; 61-70; 
71+). The demographic control variables are not shown in Table 1, but are poor predictors of general economic 
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by the inclusion of these other variables, but it is quite clear that the relationship between 
estimates of specific economic change and general economic change remains.  
 
FIGURE 4:  Predictors of economic perceptions 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the predicted impact of different independent variables on economic perceptions using 
the coefficients from model 2 of Table 1. Economic perceptions are measured on a 0-3 scale, where 0 
represents economic conditions getting a lot worse and 3 represents economic conditions getting a little or a lot 
better. The effects of growth and unemployment are for a two standard deviation increase in both compared to 
no change. The bars around the point estimates are 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
 
 
Moreover, these effects are comparable in size to the effects of partisanship on economic 
perceptions. Figure 4 shows the effects of partisanship and people’s economic estimates on 
their general economic perceptions. The effects of unemployment and growth estimates 
represent a two standard deviation increase from the benchmark. The magnitude of the effects 
is non-trivial. Increasing someone’s growth estimate by two standard deviations increases 
their score on the 0-3 economic perceptions scale by nearly half a point. The difference 
between people who thought growth had increased compared to those who thought it was 
                                                                                                                                                        
perceptions in the main, although women are less positive than men and people with no qualifications are less 
positive than the more educated. 
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static is about the same as the difference between government and opposition partisans. It is 
not that partisanship does not matter, it clearly does. But perceptions of specific facts about 
the real economy drive perceptions of general economic change, even when we account for 
partisanship and previous vote.  
 
How new information about the economy shapes economic perceptions: experimental 
evidence 
 
The findings from the observational data tell a compelling story about how changes in the 
economy shape individual economic perceptions. However, some doubts about the causal 
relationships must remain. The time-series analysis rests on the assumption that partisan 
groups remain broadly unchanged over time (Bisgaard 2015), but people may well self-select 
into partisan groups based on economic performance. Equally, a single survey of any 
population makes it difficult to disentangle causal relationships. The third part of our analysis 
is therefore based on a randomized experiment embedded in the survey discussed above. In 
this experiment, respondents are randomly assigned to groups that receive different 
information about the economy. The aim is to establish whether people who gave incorrect 
estimates of growth and unemployment update their general economic perceptions when 
given the correct information (see Nyhan and Riefler 2010). 
 
The experiment consists of two treatments, and a control group, randomly assigned to three 
groups of respondents.10 First, as discussed in the previous section, people are asked about 
                                                 
10
 Table A5 in the Appendix shows balance statistics for the treatment and control groups by the main 
independent variables. The three groups are highly balanced, as expected given the randomization of the 
treatments. 
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their own assessments of the unemployment and growth rate. The treatments then give 
respondents information about the actual level of growth and unemployment according to the 
independent Office for National Statistics. Respondents were then asked the general 
economic perceptions question. People in the control group were not given any information, 
but were simply asked the general economic perceptions question. This is the same group that 
we looked at in the previous section. This allows us to examine whether people update their 
general economic perceptions in line with actual information about the economy. The growth 
and unemployment treatments are worded as follows: 
 
a) Growth treatment 
The Office for National Statistics calculated that the actual growth rate for the January-
September period in 2013 was +1.9%, a higher rate than the +0.1% in the same period in 
2012. 
 
Thinking more generally about the economy how would you say that economic conditions 
have changed over the last 12 months? 
 
 
b) Unemployment treatment 
The Office for National Statistics calculated that the actual unemployment rate for the July-
September period in 2013 was 7.6%, a lower rate than the 7.8% in the same period in 2012. 
 
Thinking more generally about the economy how would you say that economic conditions 
have changed over the last 12 months? 
 
 
To assess the impact of new information about the economy on economic perceptions, we 
analyse how participants dealt with information that contradicted their earlier assessments of 
growth and unemployment rates. To model this we group people by their previous estimates 
of the economic statistics. For unemployment we have three categories, people who thought 
unemployment had got worse (i.e. their estimate of unemployment was higher than a year 
ago), had stayed the same (i.e. their estimate of unemployment was about the same rate as a 
year ago) or had got better (i.e. their estimate of unemployment was lower than a year ago). 
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For growth we categorize people into those who thought growth was worse (i.e. their estimate 
of the growth rate was lower than a year ago), stayed the same (i.e. their estimate of the 
growth rate was about the same rate as a year ago), had got better (i.e. their estimate of the 
growth rate was higher than a year ago), or had got better at a rate greater than had actually 
happened (i.e. their estimate of the growth rate was higher than a year ago, and higher than 
the actual rate of 1.5 per cent). Table 2 summarizes those groupings.    
 
TABLE 2:  Categorizing estimates of growth and unemployment 
 
 Growth  
range 
% of control 
group 
Unemployment 
range 
% of control 
group 
More positive than actual change 1.5 to 7 9%   
Positive change 0.2 to 1.5 44% 1 to 7.1 29% 
No change 0 to 0.2 31% 7.1 to 8 37% 
Negative change -7 to 0 16% 8 to 15 35% 
 
Note: This table categorizes people’s estimates of growth and unemployment relative to the rate of growth and 
unemployment one year ago. 
 
 
For unemployment, which had changed little, we are comparing whether people’s over and 
underestimates of change are corrected by new information, but for growth which had 
changed dramatically we are seeing whether it is people that overestimate relative to the 
benchmark that change or those that overestimate relative to the new rate that change. Table 3 
shows the results of two OLS regression models predicting economic perceptions using the 
unemployment and growth estimates, the main effect of treatment and the interaction between 
treatment and the estimates.11 The reference category for the estimates is no change. 
 
  
                                                 
11
 As shown in Table A4 in the Appendix ordered logit models give very similar results.  
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TABLE 3:  OLS regression models predicting economic perceptions   
(a) Unemployment treatment (unemployment rate is 7.6 per cent) 
  B SE 
Unemployment estimate  Positive change 0.02 0.07 
 No change (reference) - - 
 Negative change -0.62* 0.07 
Treatment  0.12 0.06 
Interaction Treatment*positive change -0.29* 0.10 
 Treatment*no change (reference) - - 
 Treatment*negative change -0.17 0.10 
Intercept  2.20* 0.05 
R-square  0.10  
* p<.05.  N = 2240. 
 
(b) Growth treatment (growth rate is 1.5 per cent) 
  B SE 
Growth estimate  More positive than actual change 0.48* 0.10 
 Positive change 0.33* 0.06 
 No change (reference) - - 
 Negative change -0.95* 0.08 
Treatment  0.11 0.07 
Interaction Treatment*more positive than actual change -0.35* 0.14 
 Treatment*positive change 0.01 0.09 
 Treatment*no change (reference) - - 
 Treatment*negative change 0.22* 0.11 
Intercept  1.95* 0.05 
R-square  0.18  
* p< .05.  N = 2406. 
 
Note: These tables show the results of OLS regression models that predict people’s economic perceptions on a 
0-3 scale. 0 represents economic conditions getting a lot worse and 3 represents economic conditions getting a 
little or a lot better. People’s estimates of growth and unemployment are relative to the rate of growth and 
unemployment one year ago. The treatment is information on the actual levels of growth (1.5 per cent) and 
unemployment (7.6 per cent). 
 
The important terms to look at here are the interactions between the treatment and people’s 
estimates of unemployment (in Table 3a) and growth (in Table 3b). For unemployment, there 
is a negative and statistically significant interaction between treatment and a previously 
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positive assessment of unemployment. People in the control group who thought 
unemployment was falling gave a rosier assessment of general economic performance than 
people who also thought unemployment was falling, but were confronted with new 
information that unemployment had actually not changed very much. Similarly for growth, 
people in the control group who thought that the growth rate had increased beyond the actual 
rate were more positive about the economy than similar people who were told that while 
growth had increased it had not increased by as much as they originally thought. There is also 
an interaction between treatment and people with negative growth estimates.  
 
Overall, these findings show that people are willing to be corrected when they receive new 
economic information. Individuals with overly optimistic views of unemployment and 
growth relative to the reality are willing to downgrade their estimates of economic 
performance. For growth, there is also evidence that people are willing to upgrade their 
assessments of economic performance when the reality is substantially better than they 
originally thought. Hence, in contrast to some of the more pessimistic assessments of voters 
as blinkered by their partisanship, we find that people respond rationally to new information 
on the economy.  
 
Conclusion  
Research on electoral behaviour has consistently shown that people’s economic perceptions 
are highly correlated with their vote choices in elections. Economic voting is thus one of the 
primary explanations for electoral outcomes, and it is rooted in the classic notion of 
democracy in which elections serve as mechanisms for the people to hold their governors to 
account for their performance (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Manin 1997). A core assumption is 
that voters’ perceptions of the economy correspond to actual performance. But do those 
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economic perceptions reflect changes in the actual economy or are such perceptions simply 
reflections of partisan predispositions? This question of whether voters’ perceptions of the 
economy are responsive to information about the real world, regardless of partisan 
attachment, is of key importance to any assessment of electoral accountability. 
 
The argument put forward in this study is that government partisans are almost invariably 
more optimistic about the economy than opposition partisans. But people, regardless of 
partisanship, also respond to changes in the economy and update their economic perceptions 
accordingly. We have used a combination of observational and experimental data to examine 
how new information about the economy shapes economic perceptions. Our results show that 
economic perceptions are influenced by the real economy. At the aggregate level, economic 
growth and economic evaluations move together. At the individual-level, people’s 
assessments of economic indicators, holding partisanship constant, are good predictors of 
general economic perceptions. Moreover, correcting people’s information about these 
economic indicators shifts their general economic perceptions. The rich set of empirical 
analyses presented in this paper thus makes a significant contribution to the study of 
economic perceptions and electoral behaviour as it speaks directly to the debate between the 
classic economic voting models and the revisionist work on the importance of partisan biases. 
Overall, our observational and empirical evidence tells a consistent story: while partisan 
biases exist, changes to economic perceptions are rooted in the real economy.  
 
Is this good news? Some might argue claim that a lack of factual knowledge is not be 
problematic in and of itself. It may be that people can make complex, reasoned choices on the 
basis of quite limited informational cues and without having to know many concrete facts 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Goren 2013). Nonetheless, it seems difficult to argue that civic 
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competence does not increase when general perceptions of the economy are at least partially 
rooted in the economic reality. Our findings thus have important implications for models of 
economic voting and democratic accountability as they suggest that relationships between 
economic perceptions and vote choice are related to actual economic performance.  
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